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1 Introduction
Confidence is often described as one of the most important ingredients for success. A sub-
stantial body of work has studied the potential for overconfident beliefs to yield benefits,
with Bénabou and Tirole (2002) presenting a noteworthy theoretical contribution. Bén-
abou and Tirole (2002) discuss how a higher level of self-confidence in one’s abilities mo-
tivates people to work hard, overcome obstacles, and take beneficial risks. Furthermore,
a growing empirical literature has studied various mechanisms through which confidence
can contribute to an individual’s success. This literature presents evidence suggesting that
higher confidence individuals are better at persuading others that they are of high ability
(Burks et al., 2013; Schwardmann and Van der Weele, 2016), work harder (Puri and Robin-
son, 2007; Pikulina et al., 2017; Chen and Schildberg-Hörisch, 2018), and that overcon-
fidence is evolutionary adaptive (Bernardo and Welch, 2001; Heifetz et al., 2007; Johnson
and Fowler, 2011).
However, in contrast to these beneficial effects of being high in confidence, there is also sub-
stantial evidence documenting that overconfident individuals are more likely to make mis-
takes, such as taking unnecessary risks in stock trading (Odean, 1998; Barber and Odean,
2001), poor managerial decisions (Malmendier and Tate, 2005), or over-entry into compe-
tition (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007).
Despite the large literature relating overconfidence to a range of outcomes, causal evidence
on the implications of an increase in an individual’s confidence is sparse.1 Yet, without
causal evidence of the effect of confidence on decisions in a particular context, one can
neither claim that increasing someone’s confidence is beneficial, nor that increasing it is
detrimental. Higher confidence could just be strongly correlated with unobserved charac-
teristics that in turn generate positive or negative outcomes. Furthermore, without empiri-
cal evidence, it is not obvious that a shift in beliefs will translate in a simple way into actions
as predicted by many economic models.
In this paper, we consider a stylized career choice game in the lab in order to study the
various mechanisms through which an exogenous shift in beliefs may operate. We develop
a simple simple theoretical framework and show empirically how an upwards shift in confi-
dence could causally influence decision-making regarding payment scheme decisions, effort
1 Some papers create exogenous variation in overconfidence by varying feedback such as Schwardmann and
Van der Weele (2016); Chen and Schildberg-Hörisch (2018) or by varying reasons for self-selection into
the experiment e.g. Camerer and Lovallo (1999).
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provision, and resulting earnings. Throughout, it is important to keep in mind the caveat
that our stylized setting abstracts away frommany factors that may play a role in real world
career choice decision making.
The following example illustrates how an increase in confidence could affect decision mak-
ing in a labor market setting. Imagine a computer programmer fresh out of college (let’s
call her “Thandi”). Thandi is well trained and has the choice between a job at a mid-sized
company that will pay her a fixed wage and the opportunity to work at a start-up where
her earnings will depend heavily on her performance, and therefore she will earn far more
if she is better than competing programmers and far less if she is worse.
Assume that Thandi, like most people, believes that she is better than average (see, amongst
others Kruger (1999); Burson et al. (2006); Healy and Moore (2007); Moore and Healy
(2008); Benoît et al. (2015)). This belief will be influential for two decisions: She needs
to choose a type of job and then, conditional on being in the job, the effort she will exert.
When it comes to the choice of job, due to her belief of being better than average, she will
be inclined to choose the start-up work to maximize her earnings.2 Choosing the ability-
contingent payment scheme of the start-up is the correct choice for her if her ability level
is actually above average, but harmful, if she wrongly believes she is better than average.
With regards to effort once in the job, however, her high self-confidence could motivate her
to work harder in the start-up because her perceived returns from effort seem higher than
in the corporate job. A high level of confidence will only be beneficial if she actually has a
sufficiently high ability level for the the job. If she overconfidently chooses a job type she
does not have the ability for, she faces the risk that her efforts do not pay off and she will
work hard for a lower wage than she would have earned in the corporate job.
Ideally, one would study these questions with actual job and effort choices. However, this
approach poses several challenges. The main issue is that it is non-trivial to gain access
to accurate measurements of the beliefs of job seekers about their abilities relative to their
direct competitors, let alone identifying the influence of an exogenous shock to their beliefs.
We circumvent these issues using a laboratory experiment. In the controlled environment of
a laboratory study, we generate exogenous variation in beliefs to measure the causal effect
of a shift in beliefs on (i) the selection into fixed or ability-contingent payment schemes, and
2 However, risk aversion might temper this inclination to choose start-up work by pushing Thandi towards
the less risky job, thereby offsetting the influence of her high confidence to some degree (see, e.g., Bonin
et al. (2007)).
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(ii) effort exerted within an incentive scheme. We derive our hypotheses for the experiment
from a simple theoretical framework.
In our experiment, a group of ten subjects takes a test measuring their relative cognitive
ability. We then ask them to estimate their probability of being in the Top Half of their
group, but provide no feedback. Next, they work on ten rounds of a real-effort task for
which they can repeatedly choose one of two payment schemes. Subjects can either choose
to work for an ability-contingent piece rate or a fixed piece rate that does not depend on
their ability. The ability-contingent piece rate pays a high wage if the subject is in the
Top Half of her group and nothing if she is in the Bottom Half. The fixed piece rate
increases in each round, but always lies below the high piece rate of the ability-contingent
piece rate. Thus, if a subject is certain of being in the Top Half of her group, choosing the
ability-contingent piece rate maximizes her earnings.
The exogenous variation in beliefs about relative ability is generated in the experiment
by exposing the entire group of ten subjects to either a harder or an easier version of the
same test. Subjects randomly confronted with an easy test assess their position in a ranking
of peers to be higher than subjects confronted with a harder test.3 This is known as the
‘hard-easy’ effect (Kruger, 1999; Moore and Kim, 2003; Moore and Small, 2007; Healy and
Moore, 2007; Dargnies et al., 2016). Individuals fail to fully appreciate that when they
find a test easy [difficult], the test may be easy [difficult] for all participants, not just for
themselves.
It is worth noting that the hard-easy effect shares some common features with the concept
of “reference group neglect”, where subjects underrespond to a change in the group com-
position (Camerer and Lovallo, 1999; Schüssler et al., 2018). In particular, both assert that
subjects neglect the fact that there is a shift in the background distribution against which
they are being compared. The hard-easy effect refers to neglect of the fact that changing
the difficulty of the test will lead to a shift in the distribution of others’ scores. In contrast,
reference group neglect refers to neglect of a shift in the distribution of other’s scores due
to a particular subset of individuals selecting into participation.4 Both of these mechanisms
3 Note, subjects are always compared only to others who have completed exactly the same test as they did,
and they know this. Therefore, subjects who face the hard test assess their relative position in relation to
others who completed the hard test.
4 Both these concepts fall into the broader class of biases, where subjects neglect some feature of the data
generating process, leading to biased inference and systematic mistakes in decision making. Notable ex-
amples include correlation neglect and selection neglect (see, e.g., Enke (2017); Jehiel (2018); Barron et al.
(2019); Enke and Zimmermann (2019)).
can result in the distorted belief that one is ranked higher than one actually is, which is
commonly referred to as “overplacement”, and which may then influence decision making
in important contexts.5
In our study, we find strong evidence that a shift in the difficulty of the test for the entire
group leads to a large shift in the average belief a subject holds regarding her relative
placement. The effect is particularly strong for subjects in the Bottom Half of the group,
who report higher beliefs on average in the easy treatment than in the hard treatment. The
beliefs of those in the Top Half are less affected on average.
In terms of this shift in beliefs translating into actions, we find that higher average confi-
dence about relative placement due to exposure to the easier test leads subjects to more
often choose the ability-contingent piece rate. If randomly confronted with the hard test,
subjects are more likely to choose the fixed piece rate. With regard to effort, we find that the
motivation of all individuals is high, regardless of their beliefs and the incentives. The shift
in beliefs has important consequences for earnings of the Bottom Half of the group. The
bottom group earns only about a quarter of what the top group earns on average, but their
average earnings are reduced even further, by about 40 percent, when their confidence has
been exogenously increased. The reason for this is that overconfidence in relative ability is
costly for below-average-ability individuals, as it increases their probability of choosing an
ability-contingent incentive scheme, which is a mistake for these individuals.
When we consider heterogeneity by gender, we find, unsurprisingly, that women in both
conditions report lower average beliefs than men (see Bertrand (2011) and Niederle (2017)
for an overview of the gender-gap in confidence). This difference is driven predominantly
by men being overconfident in their placement, on average, rather than by women under-
estimating their performance. Importantly, men and women are of equal average ability
in our data. We find no evidence of men and women reacting differently to the treatment.
However, because men make more mistakes in their choice of incentive scheme, given equal
effort men would earn less than women. However, we observe that men tend to compen-
sate for these mistakes by exerting more effort to offset part of the earnings gap. While, a
number of papers argue that differences in payment scheme choices are driven by gender
differences in risk preferences (see Eckel and Grossman (2008) and Croson and Gneezy
(2009) for surveys), we do not find evidence of risk preferences explaining a significant
5 As opposed to “overprecision”, overconfidence in the accuracy of one’s beliefs, and “overestimation”, the
overconfidence in one’s absolute ability.
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part of the gender incentive-choice gap.
An additional important contribution of this paper is that it provides evidence towards ad-
dressing one of the challenges in the beliefs literature: understanding the causal mapping
of beliefs to economic decisions. Many papers take as given that beliefs have a simple linear
causal mapping to decisions, and yet in the few papers that have investigated this rela-
tionship, the results are not so straight forward.6 Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker (2008), for
example, show that subjects in their games fail to best respond to their stated beliefs almost
half of the time, providing evidence for the fact that beliefs do not directly map into actions.
However, in a later follow-up paper, the authors use an exogenous variation in beliefs to
show that beliefs can have a causal impact on choices (Costa-Gomes et al., 2014). A related
paper by Smith (2013) also provides evidence of a causal effect of beliefs on actions, but to
a smaller extent than one would estimate with an OLS regression. Both papers use an IV
approach to reduce the endogeneity of beliefs.
The exogenous variation in beliefs through our experimental design distinguishes our paper
from others that study the relationship between beliefs about relative ability and choices
(such as Camerer and Lovallo (1999); Bruhin et al. (2016); Murad et al. (2016); Cheung
and Johnstone (2017); Pikulina et al. (2016, 2017)).7 For example, Bruhin et al. (2016)
show that individuals are more risk taking when the probability of winning depends on their
relative ability rather than on an exogenously imposed probability. However, overconfident
individuals may differ from correctly calibrated individuals in other ways than just holding
different beliefs (i.e. overconfidence may be correlated with other individual characteris-
tics). Further, our design rules out the possibility of substituting lack of ability with effort to
keep earnings stable. In experiments where ability and effort are partial substitutes, such
as that of Cheung and Johnstone (2017), less confident individuals could exert more effort
to overcome their lack of ability. Our experimental design is related in spirit to Camerer
and Lovallo (1999). In their experiment, individuals are either informed or not informed
during recruitment that they will be competing against each other based on their skill. This
information leads to self-selection into the experiment in the informed treatment and sub-
6 In a recent paper, Fischer and Sliwka (2018) distinguish between confidence in the level of one’s ability
and confidence in one’s ability to learn (i.e. their ability production function). Using feedback to generate
variation in beliefs, they show that an increase in one’s belief about their ability to learn increases motivation
to learn, while an increase in their belief about their ability level reduces motivation.
7 Furthermore, in an interesting contribution, Huck et al. (2018) consider how individuals might endoge-
nously manage their own beliefs in order to motivate themselves to perform better in a real effort task.
We view this study of endogenous belief management and motivation as complementing the current paper,
which instead focuses on the implications of an exogenous shift in beliefs.
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sequent overentry into a skillbased competition. The experimental design, however, cannot
rule out that the self-selection is driven by additional factors other than overconfidence.
This is supported by the fact that a replication by Dankova and Servatka (2018) which ex-
tends Camerer and Lovallo (1999) by studying both men and women, where the original
study focuses on men, finds that the results are highly sensitive to the participants gender.
In our experiment, overconfidence is exogenously varied between subjects two groups of
subjects that are balanced on other characteristics, allowing for a cleaner measurement that
is not driven by self-selection of participants.
Our paper provides evidence that a shift in beliefs leads to a shift in behavior and that
this shift has meaningful consequences. The causal effect of beliefs on actions has implica-
tions for both career decisions as discussed in this paper, but is also meaningful for policy
interventions in which beliefs are targeted in order to bring about a change in behavior.
2 Theoretical framework
In this section, we motivate the experimental design and hypotheses through means of a
simple model where a worker chooses her payment scheme and then effort. The objective of
the theoretical framework is to simply provide some discipline and precision to the ensuing
discussion. To do this, we augment the model used by DellaVigna and Pope (2017) in their
large-scale study of real effort and motivation.
Consider an individual i, who can earn money by performing a task that requires costly ef-
fort, e. She is either a high ability or low ability individual, a ∈ {aL, aH}. Prior to performing
the task, the individual chooses between two incentive schemes: (i) one that pays a high
wage to high-ability individuals, w(aH) = wH , and a low wage to to low-ability individuals,
w(aL) = wL, or (ii) one that pays a fixed wage to everyone, w¯, where wH > w¯ > wL. After
choosing her incentive scheme, she chooses the level of effort, e, she would like to exert.
Following DellaVigna and Pope (2017) we allow the subject to derive some intrinsic utility
from effort, denoted by s.8
8 As in DellaVigna and Pope (2017), we view this intrinsic motivation term as capturing, in reduced form, any
non-monetary reward the workers derive from working on the task. In terms of the laboratory experiment
described below, this is taken to include any sense of duty to, or gratitude towards the experimenter for the
fixed show-up fee. DellaVigna and Pope (2017) argue that this non-monetary reward term is important for
explaining the commonly observed non-zero effort in fixed-wage laboratory experiments.
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A risk-neutral individual would choose her incentive scheme, w ∈ {w¯, w(a)}, and effort
level, e, by solving the following:
max
w∈{w¯,w(a)}
max
e≥0
Ea[(s+ w) · e− c(e)] (1)
where c(e) is the cost of exerting effort, and is assumed to satisfy c′(e) > 0 and c′′(e) > 0.
The expectation operator, Ea, denotes expectations in respect to the individual’s ability, and
s represents the individual’s intrinsic motivation for completing the task. Since uncertainty
about one’s own ability is only directly relevant for the wage schedule, we can rewrite
equation 1:
max
w∈{w¯,w(a)}
max
e≥0
(s+ Ea[w]) · e− c(e) (2)
Equation 2 shows that the individual’s subjective belief regarding the likelihood that she is
high-ability, πˆ = Pˆ(a = aH), is important both for her decision of which incentive scheme
to take, and how much effort to exert if she chooses the ability-contingent incentives. Es-
sentially, the choice of an incentive scheme involves a choice between being paid a certain
piece rate of Ea[w¯] = w¯, or an expected piece rate of Ea[w(a)] = πˆ · wH for each unit of
effort. We normalise wH = 1.
The effort choice
Conditional on an incentive scheme, w, the individual chooses effort, e∗, according to the
condition c′(e∗) = s+Ea[w]. Under the certain piece rate (PR) incentive scheme she chooses
e∗PR = c
′−1(s+ w¯). Under the ability-contingent (AC) incentive scheme, she chooses e∗AC =
c′−1(s + πˆ · wH). If her confidence is sufficiently low (i.e. πˆ · wH < w¯), then the individual
exerts more effort under the certain piece rate incentives. However, if she is sufficiently
confident in her own ability, such that πˆ · wH > w¯ she expects a higher piece rate under
ability-contingent incentives, and would work harder under these incentives. We therefore
define a threshold belief, namely πe := w¯
wH
, such that:
• For low beliefs (i.e. if πˆ ∈ [0, πe]), the individual exerts more effort under certain
piece rate incentives than under ability-contingent incentives.
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• For high beliefs (i.e. if πˆ ∈ [πe, 1]), the individual exerts more effort under ability-
contingent incentives than under certain piece rate incentives.
For high levels of intrinsic motivation, s, differences in effort due to variation in monetary
incentive schemes will be harder to detect. This is a frequent challenge of laboratory real
effort tasks (DellaVigna and Pope, 2017; Erkal et al., 2016; de Araujo et al., 2015). The
time limit of the task constrains effort to be below a fixed effort level, e ≤ e¯, which can be
binding if e¯ ≤ e∗PR and e¯ ≤ e
∗
AC (e.g. this occurs when the intrinsic incentives are strong
enough to maintain effort close to the boundary under both sets of monetary incentives).
If this is the case, then the observed effort level chosen under both sets of incentives will be
equal.
The incentive scheme choice
When choosing between incentives schemes, the individual chooses the ability-contingent
incentives whenever she expects to earn more per unit of effort under them than she would
under the certain piece rate per unit of effort.
(s+ πˆ · wH) · e
∗
AC − c(e
∗
AC) ≥ (s+ w¯) · e
∗
PR − c(e
∗
PR) (3)
This inequality holds whenever πˆ · wH ≥ w¯.
9 It holds even if the effort level chosen under
both incentives schemes is the same (i.e. if e∗ = e¯). Under risk neutrality, the threshold for
the choice of incentives, and the threshold for effort choices are equal (i.e. πi = πe = w¯
wH
).
We can therefore summarise the influence of beliefs on choices as follows:
• a low confidence individual (i.e. one with a belief πˆ ∈ [0, πi]) will (i) choose the certain
piece rate incentives, and (ii) exert (weakly) lower effort under ability-contingent
incentives than under certain piece rate incentives.
9 To see this, notice that if πˆ · wH > w¯, the individual could simply choose the ability-contingent incentives
and set effort equal to the optimal effort level under certain piece rate incentives, e = e∗
P R
, and receive a
higher expected payoff than under the certain piece rate incentives, i.e.
(s+ πˆ · wH) · e
∗
P R − c(e
∗
P R) ≥ (s+ w¯) · e
∗
P R − c(e
∗
P R)
Since e = e∗
AC
maximises the LHS of this inequality, equation 3 must also hold.
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• a high confidence individual (i.e. one with a belief πˆ ∈ (πi, 1]) will (i) choose the
ability-contingent incentives, and (ii) exert (weakly) higher effort under ability-contingent
incentives than under certain piece rate incentives.
In the appendix, we relax the risk neutrality assumption and show that the threshold belief
at which individuals will switch incentive choice differs from the one at which effort is
affected by incentives.
2.1 Hypotheses
With the theoretical framework in mind, we now turn to the hypotheses for the experiment.
In the experiment, we use the well established Hard-Easy effect to induce exogenous vari-
ation in subject’s beliefs about their own ability, πˆ, keeping everything else constant (e.g.
actual ability, a). As discussed in more detail in the next section, this is done by randomly
assigning subjects to either a slightly easier or slightly harder version of the ability task.
The objective is to induce a shift in subject’s beliefs about their relative performance (in
comparison only to subjects who completed exactly the same task). This will then allow
us to study how this exogenous shift in beliefs propagates through the individual’s decision
making process to other choices.
In the experiment, it is reasonable to expect heterogeneous beliefs. Therefore we consider
a continuum of agents who hold beliefs, distributed on the unit interval, πˆ ∼ F (πˆ), such
that f(πˆ) is everywhere positive on πˆ ∈ [0, 1]. Since shifting the distribution of beliefs in the
experiment is a prerequisite for testing our other hypotheses, we call this replication of the
Hard-Easy effect Hypothesis 0.
• Hypothesis 0 (Shift in Beliefs): The Hard-Easy treatment will shift the distribution
of beliefs upwards.
An upward shift in πˆ for all individuals (constrained at πˆ = 1) will imply an increase in the
fraction of individuals choosing the ability-contingent incentives since πˆ ≥ w¯
wH
will hold for
a greater fraction of individuals.
• Hypothesis 1 (Incentive Choices): An exogenous increase in confidence will lead to
a higher fraction of individuals choosing the ability-contingent incentives.
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If intrincic motives to exert effort are sufficiently high (as in much of the experimental
literature involving real effort in the lab), then an increase in confidence will not change
effort. Otherwise, if subjects are predominantly motivated by extrinsic monetary rewards
in their effort choices, the more confident individuals will exert more effort under ability-
contingent incentives, as shown above.
• Hypothesis 2 (Effort Choices): We will observe one of the following two patterns of
behavior for effort choices. Either: (i) [high intrinsic motivation] For high confidence
individuals, effort choices are higher under the ability-contingent incentives, than
under the certain piece rate incentives. In this case, an upward shift in confidence
will increase overall average effort. (ii) [low intrinsic motivation] Effort choices are
not influenced by the incentive scheme. In this case, an exogenous shift in confidence
will not affect effort choices.
Ultimately, we also want to understand the effect of an upwards shift in confidence on
earnings. By definition, half of our individuals are classified as below average and half of
them as above average ability. Depending on their actual relative ability, a shift in beliefs
will lead to different outcomes for both groups.
We define FL(πˆ) to be the distribution of subjective beliefs of low ability individuals (aL),
and FH(πˆ) to be the distribution of subjective beliefs of high ability individuals (aH). This
implies that Fm(π
i), where m ∈ L,H, denotes the fraction of individuals with ability am
that choose the certain piece rate incentives. Similarly, if we consider an upward shift in
confidence, △πˆ, then after the shift in beliefs, Fm(π
i − △πˆ) is the fraction of individuals
with ability am that choose the certain piece rate incentives.
Expressions 4 and 5 reflect the intuitive idea that an upward shift in confidence will be
harmful to low ability individuals who switch to inappropriate ability-contingent incentives,
and beneficial to high ability types who, absent the treatment, would not have chosen the
ability-contingent scheme.10
10 The expressions in the main text assume an interior solution for effort choices. However, if there is a
binding constraint on effort choices then expressions 4 and 5 simplify to:
Gain in Earnings for High Ability Individuals
[FH(π
i)− FH(π
i −△πˆ)] · (wH − w¯) · e¯
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Gain in Earnings for High Ability Individuals:
[FH(π
i)− FH(π
i −△πˆ)] · (wH · e
∗
AC − w¯ · e
∗
PR) ≥ 0 (4)
Loss of Earnings for Low Ability Individuals:
[FL(π
i)− FL(π
i −△πˆ)] · (0− w¯ · e∗PR) ≤ 0 (5)
The term F SWITCHm = [Fm(π
i) − Fm(π
i − △πˆ)] ≥ 0 denotes the fraction of individuals of
ability type am who switch from certain piece rate to ability-contingent incentives when
there is an upward shift in confidence by △πˆ. The magnitude of the change in earnings
will depend on several factors: (i) the number of individuals who switch their incentive
scheme choice, F SWITCHm , in each group, (ii) the change in effort between the two incentive
schemes, and (iii) the incremental size of the gaps between the wages. Thus without first
determining the magnitude of these factors, we cannot unambiguously predict the average
change in earnings.
However, if an upwards shift in confidence leads to an increase in earnings for high ability
individuals and a decrease for low ability individuals then earnings inequality will increase.
• Hypothesis 3 (Earnings): While an increase in confidence has an ambiguous effect
on average earnings, the framework suggests that: (i) it will lead to weakly lower
average earnings for low-ability individuals, (ii) it will lead to weakly higher aver-
age earnings for high-ability individuals, and (iii) it will increase earnings inequality
overall.
3 Experimental Design
Our experimental design aims, firstly, to assess how an agent’s confidence in her relative
ability causally affects her choice of incentive scheme for a subsequent real effort task.
This mirrors the labour market decision of whether to pursue employment that is highly
Loss of Earnings for Low Ability Individuals
[FL(π
i)− FL(π
i −△πˆ)] · (−w¯) · e¯
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dependent on one’s ability or not. Secondly, we evaluate the relationship between the
agent’s confidence and her effort provision under the chosen incentives.
An experiment with these objectives should have the following features:
i. An exogenous shift in subjects’ beliefs about their relative ability,
ii. a separation of the role of ability and effort in the production function,
iii. a fine-grained measurement of a participant’s willingness to switch from a fixed
incentive scheme to an ability-contingent scheme, and
iv. minimisation of the influence of social preferences, risk preferences, and compet-
itive preferences.
3.1 The ability and the effort measurement tasks
Our experiment has these four features. Figure 1 outlines the timeline of the experiment.
The main components are the “Ability Task” used to measure a and the “Effort Main Task”
used to measure e. One challenge is that it is non-trivial to measure ability11 and effort12
separately. We try to address this issue using two tasks—one that we view as depending
more on the individual’s ability, and less on the effort she exerts; and one that depends
more on effort, and less on her ability. We contend that this choice of tasks provides us with
a reasonably clean measure of these two variables of interest.
The ability task
The “Ability Task” consists of a test that is often used to measure IQ. It is in this part of the
experiment that we introduce the treatment variation—discussed in more detail in Section
3.2. Subjects have four minutes to solve as many Raven Progressive Matrices13 as they can.
11We view ability, a, as being a fixed characteristic of the individual that she cannot change during the time
frame of the experiment.
12We view effort, e, as a being a malleable object that the participant has full control over.
13 Amatrix consists of nine related patterns of which one is missing. Below the matrix, there are eight possible
patterns to complete the set of nine. Subjects have to find the one piece that best completes the set. There
is only one correct answer. Due to the short time frame for solving up to 12 matrices, performance depends
mostly on cognitive ability. Subjects are either skilled at finding the missing pattern or not. Every matrix is
shown on its own screen.
13
Subjects can go back and forth between the 12 matrices and can change their answers until
the time is up. Every correct answer yields one point, and there are no negative points for
wrong answers. The task is not directly incentivised, however IQ tests tend to induce an
intrinsic motive to perform well. Importantly, the motive to perform well faced by subjects
should not differ between the two treatments.14
The effort task
The “Effort Main Task”, on the other hand, was chosen to be a task where participants had
a lot of control over their performance (i.e. it depended predominantly on how much effort
they chose to exert). We chose the slider task by Gill and Prowse (2012). Using the mouse,
participants move sliders on the screen from position zero to position 50. Sliders are shown
in a set of 20. When all 20 sliders are set to 50 the subject can click the submit button and
the sliders are reset to zero for a new round. In Section 3.4 below, we discuss the incentives
subjects face.
Since the treatment is introduced during the “Ability Task” phase of the experiment, we
also measure each individual’s baseline effort level prior to treatment under fixed piece
rate incentives. This serves two purposes. Firstly, it allows us to check for balance of effort
in the slider task between treatment groups, prior to the treatment manipulation. Secondly,
it allows us to control for baseline effort levels when assessing the impact of the treatment,
thereby reducing unobserved individual level heterogeneity.
We discuss the remaining phases of the experiment in more detail below.
Effort Practice
1 minute
Effort Baseline
8 minutes
Ability Task
4 minutes
Beliefs
Effort Main Task
10 × 2 minutes
Risk
Questionnaire
Figure 1: Sequence of experimental parts
14 Performing better in this task implies the possibility to earn more in the “Effort Main Task”. Furthermore,
the lack of financial incentives has the advantage that it should reduce the hedging motive faced by subjects
when we elicit their belief about their performance in the “Ability Task”. At this point of doing the IQ task,
subjects did not know that they would be incentivized for accurate beliefs at a later time—this is to prevent
them from intentionally performing poorly.
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3.2 The treatment variation
The objective of the treatment variation is to shift beliefs using a minimal intervention.
Therefore, the two treatment conditions are completely identical except for a slight differ-
ence in the difficulty of the Ability Task. Within each session, subjects are randomly assigned
to one of two groups. One entire groupwas exposed to a harder version, and the other group
to an easier version of the Raven Progressive Matrices. Eight of the twelve puzzles are iden-
tical across both treatments. The remaining four are either slightly easier or slightly harder
than the rest. Table 1 shows the precise sequence of Raven matrices faced in each of the
treatment groups. In each of the four differences, switching a C-matrix for an E-matrix rep-
resents an increase in difficulty. Subjects only interact within their treatment group of ten
subjects, and they know this. Our experiment uses within-session assignment to treatment
in order to avoid the numerous potential issues associated with between-session random-
ization.
Table 1: Treatment variation in ability task
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
High (Easy) C1 C3 D7 C6 D8 C2 D6 C5 C7 C12 C4 D4
Low (Hard) E4 E12 D7 C6 D8 E6 D6 C5 C7 E1 C4 D4
same / different 6= 6= = = = 6= = = = 6= = =
This approach draws on the finding in the psychology literature that suggests that when
individuals face a harder task, this shifts them towards lower confidence regarding their
beliefs of their relative position in the ability distribution. When individuals face an easier
task, this shifts them towards being more confident regarding their position in the distribu-
tion (Burson et al., 2006; Healy and Moore, 2007; Larrick et al., 2007; Moore and Healy,
2008; Bordley et al., 2014; Benoît et al., 2015). Importantly, it is assumed that the com-
position of the group stays constant, so there is no reason for the individual’s actual rank
to change when the difficulty of the test is shifted. However, when determining their rank-
ing within a group, individuals anchor on their assessment of their own performance and
don’t adjust their belief about the distribution of others’ scores sufficiently. Kruger (1999)
shows that this miscalibration can lead to the majority of subjects evaluating themselves as
worse-than-average in difficult tasks and better-than-average in easy tasks.
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In our experiment, we therefore name the treatment in which subjects face the hard test,
the “Low confidence” treatment, and the treatment in which subjects face the easier test,
the “High confidence” treatment.
3.3 The belief elicitation
After the “Ability Task” we elicit subjects’ beliefs about their relative performance in com-
parison to the 9 other participants in their group who faced the same task as them.15 More
specifically, we asked subjects the following question: “What do you think is the probabil-
ity that you scored among the top 5 participants in the IQ picture task?”. In order to give
some guidance in thinking about probabilities, we provided the participants with a scale of
possible answers ranging from “0 - I am certain that I scored in the bottom half” to “100 - I
am certain that I scored in the top half”. They were free to state any number from 0 to 100.
Their guess is incentivized using the quadratic scoring rule (Selten, 1998).16 The quadratic
scoring rule is explained in detail to them in the provided instructions, both on screen and
on paper. The scoring rule is designed to provide the highest expected payoff when subjects
state their true beliefs. Maximum earnings are e2 for the belief elicitation task. Further, we
additionally ask them to report their best guess of how many points they scored in the task
and what they believe the 5th highest score in their group is (unincentivized, in order to
avoid hedging). The belief elicitation came as a surprise at this point in the experiment to
prevent subjects artificially manipulating their earlier “Ability Task” scores in anticipation
of the belief elicitation.
3.4 The payment scheme choice
One of the objectives of the experimental design was to obtain a fine grained measurement
of subject’s valuation of the ability contingent payment scheme. Therefore, we constructed
15 Subjects knew that they were randomly assigned to one of two groups of ten within the session, and that
all the other members of their group faced the same “Ability Task”, however they didn’t know that the other
group faced a different “Ability Task”. It was made clear to them that only their own group’s performance
was relevant for them, and there was no interaction at all between groups.
16We view the usage of both the QSR incentives, and the intuitive descriptions associated with different
probability levels, as providing an appealing compromise approach to the belief elicitation. It allows us to
maintain the appealing theoretical properties of a proper scoring rule, but also provides subjects with an
intuitive and easily understandable guide for answering the question.
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a payment scheme that aims to achieve this. Instead of having a single choice between
a fixed piece rate and an ability contingent payment scheme, subjects face ten rounds of
two-minute real effort tasks. In each of these rounds (except the first), subjects can choose
whether they would prefer a fixed piece rate, or whether they want to work under the
ability-contingent piece rate. Importantly, in order to assess the value of the piece rate
that makes the subject indifferent between the two incentive schemes, the fixed piece rate
is incrementally increased in each round (see Figure 2 below). The round in which the
subject switches allows the analyst to assess the subject’s valuation of the ability contingent
incentives.
A second important feature of the experimental design is that the ability component of the
production function is fixed through the “Ability Task”. Thus an individual’s ability mea-
sure is fixed before she reports her belief, and before she makes choices between payment
schemes. The idea is to obtain ameasure of ability that isn’t affected by the payment scheme
chosen. Since the relative ability distribution (i.e. the relevant ability distribution in our
experiment) is the same in the two treatment groups, it is only the subjects’ beliefs that
are shifted between treatment groups. Differences in behaviour can therefore be causally
attributed to this exogenous belief shift, holding all else constant.
The ability-contingent piece rate has a high payoff of e1 per 20 sliders if the subject was
in the Top Half of her group in the “ability task” and a low payoff of e0 per 20 sliders
if she was in the Bottom Half. This implies that the optimal incentive scheme choice for
the participant has already been determined when she makes her incentive scheme choices.
Furthermore, we as the analysts know what her optimal choice is. This rules out potential
issues that can arise if one were to allow participants to first make an incentive scheme
choice, and then produce output that depends on both ability and effort. For example, in
this case, one would not be able to distinguish a high ability individual who exerts low
effort from a low ability individual who exerts high effort. This would make it difficult
for us to identify the influence of a shift in beliefs on incentive scheme choices and effort
choices, since both ability and beliefs would be influencing the outcomes. Our design aims
to overcome these challenges.
In order to rule out learning effects (with respect to own ability), subjects receive no feed-
back about either their relative ability score or their performance in any components of the
“Effort Task” tasks until the very end of the experiment. With the exception of Round 1,
before the start of each round, participants choose whether they want to work for the fixed
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piece rate or whether they want to work for the ability-contingent piece rate. The fixed
piece rate increases in each period from e0.15 per 20 sliders in the second period to e0.80
per 20 sliders in the last period. Incentives for the fixed piece rate work like a multiple
price list for safe vs. risky choices, and allow us to obtain a fine-grained measure of how
subjects’ beliefs translate into actions (i.e. incentive scheme choices). Once the expected
earnings from the ability-contingent piece rate are lower than the fixed piece rate in that
period, individuals should switch to the fixed piece rate and choose it for the remainder
of the experiment, assuming risk neutral preferences. Expected earnings from the ability-
contingent piece rate depend on the subject’s belief. For example, if a subject is 60% sure
to be in the Top Half then she should switch to the fixed piece rate in period 7 when the
fixed piece rate of e0.65 is larger than her expected ability-contingent piece rate of e0.60.
Figure 2 gives an overview of the payment scheme.
Figure 2: Payment Scheme in Main Effort Task
In the first period, all participants have to work for the ability-contingent piece rate. This
feature allows us to assess how the shift in confidence affects effort provision when all
subjects are forced to work under the ability-contingent piece rate, thereby avoiding en-
dogenous selection effects—in all other rounds the incentive scheme that a subject faces is
endogenous. In the end, five of the ten rounds are randomly chosen for payment. Subjects
had to answer four control questions before starting the task to ensure comprehension of
the payment scheme. To elicit the baseline motivation of moving sliders, subjects complete
9 minutes of the “Effort Task” at the start of the experiment, the first minute being an un-
incentivized practice round. In the baseline round, we pay e0.30 per 20 sliders, and all
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completed sets are paid out.17
3.5 The risk elicitation
Finally, we elicited risk preferences by adapting the preferences module on risk taking by
Falk et al. (2016) to our setting. The staircase procedure is essentially equivalent to a tradi-
tional multiple price list, presenting multiple choices between a sure payoff and a gamble,
but simply requires fewer decisions on the part of the subject in comparison to a traditional
price list. It achieves this as follows: Depending on whether the subject chose the sure pay-
ment or the gamble, the algorithm generates a new choice, which makes the option that was
not chosen slightly more attractive by increasing or decreasing the sure payoff. Therefore,
it avoids asking subjects to make redundant choices.
The staircase we used had four choices between a sure payment and a gamble. The outcome
of the gamble was always e0 or e1 and the probability of winning was 50 percent. The sure
payment varied in its amount. One of the decisions was randomly chosen for payment.18
In the end, we administered a comprehensive questionnaire.
3.6 The procedure
The experiment was programmed in zTree (Fischbacher, 2007) and conducted at the WZB-
TU experimental laboratory in 2017. Participants were solicited through an online database
using ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) from a subject pool of mostly undergraduate students from
all faculties. In total 100 subjects participated in 5 sessions, 20 in each. 47 of them were
17 The objectives of the baseline round were the following. Firstly, it allows subjects to familiarize themselves
with the slider task, thereby ameliorating learning effects during the main effort task. Secondly, it allowed
us to obtain a baseline measure of subjects’ effort choices prior to the treatment variation under fixed
incentives. This allows us to check for baseline balance in effort, and also to control for subjects’ baseline
effort at the individual level.
18We have two more staircases for which we use the subjects’ own reported beliefs as the probability for the
gamble. We do this as it allows us to compare their choices in the risk task with their incentive scheme
choices. While the risk task involves a choice between a pure lottery and a fixed payment, the main task
involves the choices of which payment scheme to work under. Both tasks share the same values of outcomes
and subjective probabilities. Therefore, it allows us to assess whether there are any differences in how
probabilities affect choice tasks and effort tasks. As a caveat, the risk elicitation always comes after the
incentive scheme choices, which could motivate subjects to make consistent choices in the risk task. The
third staircase is a mirror of the second and only used for keeping incentives fair to not favor individuals
that stated high beliefs, as high beliefs increase the chance of winning the gamble.
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female, 49 male and four chose not to self-report their gender. Subjects received a show-up
fee of e5 plus their earnings from the tasks. Mean earnings for the 60 minutes sessions
amounted to e13.30. The relevant instructions were handed out to participants at the
beginning of each stage and read out loud.
4 Results
Section 4 shows the effects of an exogenous shift in beliefs on the choice of the incentive
scheme, effort, and earnings. In section A.2 we draw a parallel between the choices induced
by our treatment and observed gender differences in choice.
4.1 Exogenously shifting beliefs
The main objective of our treatment manipulation was to achieve an exogenous shift in
the participant’s beliefs about their relative performance in an IQ test. It is therefore of
central importance to confirm that we did indeed shift participants’ beliefs. We hypothe-
sized (Hypothesis 0) that average beliefs about relative performance in the High confidence
treatment would be higher than average beliefs about relative performance in the Low con-
fidence treatment.
We find a significant difference in the participants’ level of confidence between the two
treatment groups. We measure an individual’s level of confidence as the stated probability
of being in the Top Half of their randomly assigned group of ten subjects.19 Participants ex-
posed to the easy test state on average higher levels of confidence than participants exposed
to the more difficult test.
Figure 3 shows that the average participant exposed to the easy ability task reported that
there was an 84 percent chance that she was in the Top Half of her group of 10. Using
a t-test, we find this to be significantly higher than the belief of 63 percent reported by
participants exposed to the more difficult test (p-value < 0.01).
19 There were twenty participants in each session. Within each session, half were randomly assigned to each
treatment condition. However, subjects only knew there were two groups of ten and that they would only
interact with their group.
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Figure 3: Average stated beliefs by treatment
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Note: (i) Vertical lines denote 95% CI around the mean.
This significant shift in observed beliefs justifies our use of the names, High and Low for
the high confidence [easy IQ test] and low confidence [difficult IQ test] treatment groups.
To confirm that we are working with a balanced sample (which should be the case due
to within-session randomization), we show that there are no significant differences in the
characteristics of the subjects between the treatments. Table 6, reported in the Appendices,
presents summary statistics for the participants, showing that the average of the gender, age,
pre-treatment baseline effort level and 50-50 risk variables are not significantly different
between treatments.
This table also reports the differences in absolute scores under the easy and difficult IQ
test, which generates the treatment difference in beliefs about relative performance. In the
High confidence treatment subjects solved on average 10.9 Raven matrices with a standard
deviation of 1.20. In the Low confidence treatment subjects solved on average 6.9 Raven
matrices with a standard deviation of 2.80. However, by construction, in each treatment
exactly half the subjects are in the Top Half of the within-treatment ability distribution,
and half are in the Bottom Half. Our first result is simply a replication of the Hard-Easy
effect in our setting (although, the magnitude of the effect is noteworthy, given the small
treatment manipulation). Regarding gender differences in beliefs, we find that while the
starting level of confidence between men and women was different with women having a
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lower average confidence, the treatment had the same effect on both genders (see Appendix
for a detailed analysis of gender effects).
Result 0 A reduction in the level of difficulty of the ability task increases the average confi-
dence of the participants about their relative performance.
4.2 Influence of beliefs on incentive choices
Next, we showwhether the exogenous increase in confidence leads to a higher fraction of in-
dividuals choosing the ability-contingent (AC) incentives (Hypothesis 1). This is important
because an individual who chooses the incentive scheme that is most appropriate for her
ability type will earn substantially more than the individual who chooses the inappropriate
incentive scheme.
As described above, in rounds 2 to 10, the fixed piece rate increases incrementally. If we
let w¯r denote the fixed piece rate in each round, with r ∈ {2, 3, ..., 10}, then a risk-neutral
individual should switch to the fixed piece rate once the level of the fixed piece rate exceeds
the expected piece rate under ability-contingent incentives, according her belief (i.e. she
should choose the fixed piece rate ∀r : πi,r > πˆ where πi,r := w¯
r
wH
).
Figure 4: Propensity to Choose Ability-Contingent Incentives
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This logic implies that an upward shift in participants’ beliefs should lead to a shift towards
choosing the ability-contingent incentives more often. Indeed we find that in the High
treatment the fraction of ability-contingent piece rate chosen is significantly higher than in
the Low treatment (ttest p < 0.01). See Figure 4 (and Table 6).
The first two columns of Table 2 below provide further evidence towards reiterating the
same point by showing that there is a significant difference in the propensity to choose
the ability-contingent incentives between the two treatment groups. Columns (3) to (5)
show that the subjects’ reported beliefs about their likelihood of being in the Top Half
are highly predictive of their incentive scheme choices. More specifically, a 1 percentage
point increase in a participants’ belief is associated with her choosing the ability-contingent
incentives 0.86 to 0.94 percentage points more often. A nice feature of our experiment is
that the exogenous shift in beliefs due to our treatment allows us to instrument for the belief
variable in columns (4) and (5), showing that this result is not driven by other unobserved
differences between individuals who hold high beliefs and low beliefs.
Table 2: Propensity to Choose the AC Incentives
OLS OLS OLS IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treatment (HIGH=1) 0.18∗∗ 0.18∗∗
(0.07) (0.07)
Subj Belief 0.86∗∗∗ 0.94∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.26) (0.26)
Risk (CE p=50) 0.21
(0.19)
Constant 0.50∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ -0.01 -0.07 -0.17
(0.05) (0.08) (0.09) (0.20) (0.22)
Session Fixed Effects X X X X
Observations 100 100 100 100 100
Adjusted R2 0.058 0.068 0.462
First-Stage F 13.91 13.88
Notes: (i) In the IV Regressions, Subjective Beliefs are instrumented using the treatment
dummy. (ii) Standard errors in parentheses. (iii) Dependent variable: fraction of
AC choices in rounds 2 to 10.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Result 1 An increase in the participants’ level of confidence lead to a higher propensity to
choose the ability-contingent incentives.
While the discussion above has focused on the average propensity to choose the ability-
contingent incentives across all rounds, we can also examine the incentive choices within
each round. Since the fixed piece rate increases incrementally in value over the rounds,
we would expect that the fraction choosing the ability-contingent incentives would de-
crease over the rounds in both treatment groups. However, the main question of interest is
whether there is a significant difference in the fraction choosing ability-contingent incen-
tives between the treatment groups. Figure 5 provides evidence towards addressing this
question.
The figure plots the fraction choosing the ability-contingent incentives in each round for
each treatment group. In addition, we plot a 95% confidence intervals around the means,
clustering the standard errors at the individual level.20
Figure 5: Propensity to Choose Ability-Contingent Incentives (by Round)
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Figure 5 shows that in both treatments, the fraction of subjects choosing the ability-contingent
incentives is decreasing from round 2 to round 10, with much of this decrease taking place
between round 4 and 7. The fraction choosing ability-contingent incentives is higher in the
20 Essentially, we estimate a linear regression, and calculate 95% confidence intervals around the coefficients,
using a typical marginal effects plot.
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High treatment in all rounds. However, this difference is not significant for the low and
high rounds. Table 8 in the Appendix shows that while there is significant difference in the
propensity to choose the ability-contingent incentives when all rounds are pooled together
for each individual (t-test p < 0.01), if we consider each round separately, only the middle
rounds (ie. rounds 4 to 8) yield a significant treatment difference at the 5% level.21 One
reason for this is that there are some individuals who are highly certain that they are in
the Top Half, and therefore always choose the ability-contingent incentives, and similarly,
there are individuals who always choose the certain piece rate incentives. Therefore, in
rounds 2 and 3 both treatments are close to the ceiling of ability-contingent choices, while
in round 9 and 10, both treatment groups are close to the floor of ability-contingent choices.
Overall, the evidence suggests that there was a strong behavioral response to the shift in
confidence due to the treatment, implying a large difference in participants’ likelihood of
taking up the riskier ability contingent incentives. As we will discuss below, this shift in
incentive scheme choices is harmful to some and beneficial for others.
Figure 6: Per minute effort in baseline and main task by treatment
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4.3 Influence of beliefs and incentive choice on effort
Once an individual has chosen her incentive scheme, the second choice she has to make
within a job is the choice of how much effort to exert. With regards to this effort choice, our
21 Round 6 is significant at the 1% level, and round 2 is significant at the 10% level.
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simple theoretical framework yields two sets of predictions. These depend on whether the
effort choice is an interior solution to the optimization problem, or whether the conditions
in the lab imply that effort is constrained (e.g., by the time available, in combination with
strong intrinsic motivation), leading to a boundary solution. As mentioned above, this latter
scenario may be more relevant if the cost of effort in the lab depends mostly on the duration
that effort is expended, and the time is insufficient for an interior solution. A high intrinsic
motivation, s, might then mask any differences in effort due to incentives. The former may
be the case if the cost of effort depends on substantially more on the intensity of effort
exerted implying an interior solution is more likely in a short time-frame. This difference
is only possible to observe if s is low enough.
Taken together, the data collected in our experiment is more consistent with the second
scenario than the first. We measure effort using the variable “effort per minute”, which
reflects the number of sliders completed during each minute within a particular round.
Mainly, we find no significant difference in average effort exerted between treatment groups
(see Figure 6 and Table 8 in the Appendix).
Additionally, we present two pieces of evidence that suggest that effort is not responding
to the participant’s incentive choice, nor to the participant’s beliefs when she does face the
ability-contingent incentives.22
Figure 7: Effort choices across rounds, by treatment
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22 Recall, that in the discussion above we saw a strong response of incentive choice to beliefs above, so we can
rule out the hypothesis that beliefs are not meaningful.
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Figure 7 plots the average per minute effort exerted in the baseline round, as well as in every
subsequent round. While we do see some initial learning, after the baseline round, there is
very little change in effort exerted even though the value of the piece rate under the certain
piece rate incentives increases from e0.1 to e0.8, and the fraction of individuals choosing
these certain piece rate incentives increases substantially in both treatment groups.
Furthermore, Figure 8 focuses on the first round in which all participants were forced to
face the ability-contingent incentive scheme. This feature avoids the endogeneity issue that
we face in subsequent rounds in which participants choose both their effort level and their
incentive scheme. Considering the full sample, this figure shows that in both treatments,
effort is highly unresponsive to beliefs. In particular, even individuals who reported a belief
of zero, still exert effort that is similar to the mean effort exerted by those who stated a
belief of one hundred. While our treatment successfully shifted the beliefs of participants
in the two treatments, it did not affect the relationship between beliefs and effort, which is
rather flat.
Figure 8: Per minute effort in first round under ability-contingent incentives
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This finding is not surprising considering the recent literature on the unresponsiveness of
effort to incentives in real-effort lab experiments (de Araujo et al., 2015; Corgnet et al.,
2015; DellaVigna and Pope, 2017; Erkal et al., 2016). Most papers find that there is signif-
icant intrinsic motivation to work on the task, regardless of any incentives. There is some
evidence that this motivation can be reduced by giving the subjects the opportunity for
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leisure activities or the chance to leave the experiment or when each unit of effort itself is
made costly (see for example the ball catching task by Gächter et al. (2016).) We did allow
subjects to use their mobile phones in silent mode during the main task if they did not want
to work.
Table 3: Effort Choice (per minute) Under AC Incentives (Round 1)
OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment (HIGH=1) -0.09 -0.09
(0.45) (0.44)
Subj Belief 1.11 -0.46 -2.29 -2.30
(0.79) (2.19) (1.79) (1.79)
Baseline Effort 1.00∗∗∗ 1.00∗∗∗
(0.16) (0.16)
Risk (CE p=50) 0.50
(1.37)
Constant 11.32∗∗∗ 11.97∗∗∗ 11.09∗∗∗ 12.27∗∗∗ 3.91∗∗∗ 3.68∗∗
(0.31) (0.54) (0.77) (1.76) (1.10) (1.27)
Session Fixed Effects X X X X X
Observations 100 100 100 100 100 100
Adjusted R2 -0.010 0.013 0.033
First Stage F 13.92 13.09 13.03
Notes: (i) Dependent variable: Round 1 effort per minute. (ii) Higher values of risk variable
(i.e. certainty equivalent for 50-50 gamble) imply risk loving. (iii) Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3 reiterates these results by examining the correlates of effort in Round 1 (i.e., under
ability-contingent incentives). In particular, columns (1) and (2) confirm that there is no
treatment difference in effort choices, columns (3) and (4) provide further evidence that
there is no significant relationship between an individuals’ belief and her effort choices. In
columns (5) and (6), we include baseline effort, which was chosen before participants re-
ceived treatment. These regressions show a strong correlation between baseline effort, and
effort in round 1, suggesting that intrinsic motivation, s, is an important component in the
effort function. Furthermore, we again observe no significant relationship between effort
and beliefs (although, the negative sign on the point estimates is slightly surprising). Taken
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together, we view the evidence as being highly consistent with the conclusion that effort
choices are constrained within the context of our experimental design. The unresponsive-
ness of effort has the positive feature of allowing us to study the implications of shifting
beliefs on incentives choices, and earnings, while effort choices are essentially constant.
Result 2 Effort choices are largely unresponsive to shifts in beliefs, and to the participant’s
choice of incentive scheme. This is likely due to the time constraint of the experiment and a
high intrinsic motivation.
4.4 Earnings
Following our theoretical framework, we now turn to the effect of increased confidence
in earnings. Hypothesis 3 stated that increased average confidence will lead to i) weakly
lower earnings for low-ability individuals, ii) weakly higher earnings for high ability indi-
viduals and iii) result in a higher earnings inequality overall. The discussion below provides
evidence towards evaluating these hypotheses.
Our predictions for the influence of a shift in confidence on earnings of the average individ-
ual are ambiguous. Since effort choices are fairly inelastic, the effect of a shift in confidence
on average earnings depends on: (i) the fraction of incentive choice switchers of each abil-
ity type, namely Top Half (αH), and Bottom Half (αL), and (ii) the change in wage for
each switcher (
∑
r[0− w¯
r] for αL, and (
∑
r[wH − w¯
r] for αh, summing over all rounds r for
which the individual switches).
Table 4 shows the change in an individual’s main task earnings if she switches from cer-
tain piece rate incentives to ability-contingent incentives in all rounds, conditional on her
ability type. Since there is some heterogeneity in effort choices between the Top Half and
Bottom Half individuals23 the table uses the average effort choices of each ability group.
Comparing these values to the average main task earnings of e7 shows that choosing the
optimal incentive choice can have a substantial influence on earnings, within the context
of the experiment. Furthermore, the benefit toTop Half individuals of switching to ability-
contingent incentives is of a similar magnitude to the loss to Bottom Half individuals.
The overall effect of an increase in confidence on earnings is therefore likely to depend
predominantly on the number of switchers of each ability type.
23
Top Half individuals complete slightly more sliders (12.58 per minute) in comparison to Bottom Half
individuals (11.75 per minute). This difference is significant at the 10% level.
29
Table 4: Potential gains / losses from shifting incentive choice from PR-always to AC-always
Piece Rate Inc (PR) Ability-Contingent Inc (AC) Net Change in Earnings
Bottom Half e5.4 e0 – e5.4
Top Half e6.8 e12.6 e5.8
Notes: (i) This table uses observed average effort by all TOP (12.58 per min) and BOTTOM (11.75 per min)
individuals. (ii) The Net values are the change in earnings when switching from PR to AC. (iii) The difference
between TOP and BOTTOM under PR incentives is due to Round 1, where all participants face AC incentives,
and due to the slight difference in ave. effort mentioned in (i).
Figure 9 presents evidence on the average effect of the shift in confidence in our experiment.
It shows that average earnings decrease from e7.27 to e6.69with an increase in confidence.
However this difference is not significant (see Table 8 in the Appendix).
Figure 9: Average earnings by treatment
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When we split the sample by ability, we find that this reduction in average earnings comes
entirely from the low-ability individuals. We see this in Figure 10, with Bottom Half
individuals’ earnings reduced by 40% from e3.47 to e2.11, and Top Half earnings almost
unchanged by the treatment, at just above e11. Table 5 confirms the results displayed in
these figures, showing that there is a significant drop in the earnings of the Bottom Half
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group (p < 0.05). The Top Half experienced a small, insigniﬁcant increase in earnings.
The average effect when pooling ability types has a negative sign but is not significant.
Figure 10: Average earnings by ability and treatment
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Table 5: Change in Earnings due to Exogenous Belief Shift
All Bottom Top
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment (HIGH=1) -0.59 -0.57 -1.36∗∗ -1.35∗∗ 0.19 0.20
(0.99) (1.01) (0.63) (0.64) (0.82) (0.81)
Constant 7.27∗∗∗ 10.39∗∗∗ 3.47∗∗∗ 5.81∗∗∗ 11.07∗∗∗ 11.69∗∗∗
(0.70) (2.32) (0.45) (1.55) (0.58) (1.87)
Baseline Effort X X X
Risk CE (p=0.5) X X X
Session Fixed Effects X X X
Observations 100 100 50 50 50 50
Adjusted R2 -0.007 -0.029 0.070 0.062 -0.020 -0.001
Notes: (i) Dependent variable: Main Task Earnings, (ii) Std Errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
This evidence illustrates the predictions discussed in the theoretical framework section,
showing that an increase in confidence leads to a drop in earnings for the low ability in-
dividuals who are already earning far less, and thereby moving in the direction of higher
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overall earnings inequality.24
Result 3 An increase in confidence leads to low ability individuals earning even less than their
already low earnings, while high ability individuals are unaffected. This is suggestive of an
increase in inequality with higher confidence, but our data does not permit us to estimate a
significant change in inequality.
One outstanding question is why we observe a relatively large decrease in earnings for the
low ability individuals, but hardly any change in earnings for the high ability individuals.
We consider this question in the following subsection.
4.4.1 Why is there a larger impact on the Bottom Half individuals?
The discussion above showed that while the increase in confidence reduced the earnings of
the Bottom Half individuals, it had no impact on the Top Half individuals. Since effort
levels, within ability type, are relatively unresponsive to treatment, the lack of an impact on
earnings of the Top Half individuals must be due to fewer of them switching their incentive
scheme. In this section, we look at how the beliefs of the different ability types are affected
by the treatment.
Firstly, Figure 11 plots the CDFs of beliefs in each of the treatment groups. The figure shows
that the entire belief distribution is shifted to the right between the Low and theHigh treat-
ment groups.25 However, in order to understand why we only observe a shift in earnings for
the Bottom Half ability individuals, we need to consider the belief distributions of each
ability type separately (as indicated in equations 4 and 5 by the FH(·) and FL(·) functions).
24While the GINI coefficient increases from 0.275 in Low to 0.293 in HIGH, and Figure 17 provides suggestive
evidence of higher inequality in theHigh treatment by plotting the earnings histograms of both treatments,
a Mann-Whitney ranksum test indicates that there is no significant difference between the earnings distribu-
tions in the two treatments. Furthermore, a difference-in-difference estimate of the change in the earnings
between the Top Half and Bottom Half within each group has a negative point estimate of -1.56 but is
not significant at the 10% level. We are underpowered to detect the effect of treatment on inequality.
25 A Mann-Whitney ranksum test indicates that the beliefs in the two treatments are drawn from different
distributions (p < 0.01)
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Figure 11: CDF of Beliefs, by Treatment
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Figure 12 displays these belief CDFs for each ability type separately, comparing treatments.
It is immediately apparent from these figures that the majority of the shift in beliefs be-
tween treatments is due to the shift in beliefs among individuals in the Bottom Half of the
distribution. One reason for this is that on average there is relative overconfidence even in
the Low treatment, with the Top Half individuals holding very high beliefs, leaving little
room for their beliefs to increase. Essentially, the Top Half individuals are always confident
that they are in the Top Half, and the treatment does little to shift this. In contrast, the
Bottom Half individuals appear to hold more malleable beliefs about their ability. When
faced with an easier test, they adjust their level of confidence upwards which leads to costly
mistakes in incentive choices.26
26 At first glance, this finding might remind the reader of the Dunning-Kruger effect (Kruger and Dunning,
1999). The Dunning-Kruger effect claims that low-ability individuals do not have the means to understand
that they are low ability and thus grossly overestimate their relative ability, while high ability individuals
can correctly assess their position or are even a bit underconfident in their relative abilities. If the Dunning-
Kruger effect would be dominant in our experiment, we should have seen no effect of the treatment or
potentially even the opposite. If more difficult tasks make it harder for low ability individuals to estimate
their position in a relative ability ranking because they lack the knowledge to evaluate how well they did,
then we should have seen higher average beliefs of the Bottom Half individuals in the HARD test than
in the EASY test treatment. And yet we see the opposite. It seems more likely that the perceived level of
difficulty indicates how well they think they performed. A task that feels easy creates the belief that one is
good at it and especially better than others.
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Figure 12: CDF of Beliefs of Top Half and Bottom Half, by Treatment
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The vertical blue lines in Figure 12 refer to the beliefs thresholds, πi,r, that indicate the
optimal incentive choice for the risk-neutral individual in each round, r. For example, πi,5 =
0.5 is the threshold for round 5. The risk neutral individual should choose ability-contingent
incentives in round 5 if her belief is higher than this threshold. Therefore, we can directly
read off the fraction of individuals who should choose ability-contingent incentives in each
round, under risk neutrality, given their beliefs. This serves to illustrate equations visually 4
and 5, and to demonstrate how the shift in beliefs among the Bottom Half translates into
differences in incentive choices, which are less pronounced among Top Half individuals.
In summary, the impact of treatment on the earnings of the Bottom Half, but not the Top
Half is driven by the fact that the Top Half are already highly confident in their ability,
and choosing ability-contingent incentives, while the Bottom Half hold more malleable
beliefs and are willing to be convinced that they are in the Top Half when taking an easier
test.
5 Discussion and Policy Implications
One needs to be careful when extrapolating laboratory results to real world settings. Nev-
ertheless, sometimes the stylized nature of the experiment allows for an analysis of mecha-
nisms that cannot be disentangled in observational data and which can generate new ways
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of looking at economic phenomena.
So how do our ﬁndings translate to the world outside of the laboratory? While our illustra-
tive model and experiment adopt a slightly extreme assumption of ability and effort being
perfect complements, there are many professions in which low ability can only be compen-
sated for by increased effort to a small extent. Especially in creative domains such as the
arts, and writing or even research, quantity cannot compensate for quality. The program-
mer, Thandi, in our initial example might spend hours writing code without any of it being
useful. Similarly, many entrepreneurs spend years working hard and do not succeed in their
endeavors. In the case of start-ups, “ability” can be understood as the business idea and the
quality of the product or the service. Entrepreneurs might have overconfident beliefs about
their product compared to others. An analysis of failed start-ups showed that it was not
the lack of passion or perseverance that caused the failure, but for 42 percent of analyzed
start-ups there was no market for the offered product (Griffith, 2014). A lack of demand
can usually not be solved by an increase in effort. Being overconfident in one’s idea or own
ability will then waste resources and motivation that could be better employed towards a
different endeavor.
If beliefs about relative ability are so important for labor market choices, it is relevant
to ask when and where these beliefs develop.27 For many, the first job out of college is a
decisive step for their future career. Therefore, the beliefs about their relative ability created
in college will be the basis on which graduates make their labor market entry decisions.
One would think that universities should have an interest in generating accurate beliefs
in their students. Nevertheless, the educational sector seems to favor promoting students’
general confidence over accurate beliefs. The past two decades have seen an enormous
grade inflation both in the US and many European countries (Rosovsky and Hartley, 2002).
According to the Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA, 2017), in 1994, only 7 percent
of all students received a first class degree in the UK. In 2016, it is now more common
to receive a first class degree than a lower second (24 percent vs. 21 percent). Some
universities award first class degrees to more than one-third of their graduates.28 There
27 Schulz and Thöni (2016) show that students in business subjects are more prone to overconfidence than
students in the humanities, but that overconfidence is not correlated with lenght of time spent in a study
program
28 Interestingly, the high fraction of first class degrees is especially prevalent in the higher ranked schools such
as Imperial College London (41.8 percent of first degrees) and University College London (35.6 percent). In
2013, the most frequently awarded grade in both Harvard and Princeton was a straight A with the median
being an A- (Clarida and Fandos, 2013).
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is evidence that grade inflation is even higher in the creative fields such as music, where
ability and talent are even more important. 64 percent of students receive firsts at the
Royal Academy of Music in the UK. This grading system might make students feel good
about themselves as in the case of our High confidence treatment, but it does not provide
precise feedback of where they stand in the ability distribution. More precise feedback could
benefit both students at the top because the signaling value of the grades increases, and the
students further down, because it provides more useful feedback on a student’s skill in a
particular subject compared to her peers.29
In general, it is often difficult to obtain accurate and precise feedback about sensitive at-
tributes in everyday life. One reason for this is perhaps that social stigma against providing
negative feedback about sensitive attributes, implying a coarsening of the feedback actually
provided by parents, friends and colleagues. In particular, Gneezy et al. (2017) show that
individuals are usually unwilling to give negative open feedback. However, without honest
feedback, there is a risk that those individuals, who are by definition below average in a
particular ability, will hold inflated beliefs about themselves and waste precious time and
effort. In our experiment, ability is one-dimensional, but in the real world, these individuals
have other skills that they could focus on instead.
The feedback that individuals receive either through means of formal channels, such as
grading and work evaluations or through informal channels, such as communication from
friends and family, is very important in shaping an individual’s confidence level. This ex-
periment, as well as evidence from other studies discussed in the introduction, show that
confidence is not a static trait, but can be affected by something as simple as the level of
difficulty of a task. Remember that in our experiment the only difference between the two
conditions were four slightly harder puzzles out of 12 in the Low confidence treatment that
resulted in the significant shift in beliefs for the below average ability individuals. This
feature implies that real feedback is likely to have a far larger influence on an individual’s
confidence and decision making. Therefore, while there may certainly be substantial ben-
efits to building up confidence, this paper then serves as a cautionary tale regarding some
29 It is worth pointing out that there are also cases where the reverse is true, namely that individuals make
poor decisions due to underconfidence. For example, students sometimes select out of difficult subjects
too quickly because they are underconfident. STEM subjects see very high drop-out rates early on, espe-
cially among women and minority students (Arcidiacono et al., 2016). If these students neglect to take
into account that what they experience as difficult is also difficult for their peers, then those students will
give up too quickly, assuming that they are worse than average. Therefore, in this case, the same lack
of well-calibrated beliefs about one’s abilities leads to suboptimal decision making - only here it is due to
underconfidence. These students, too, would benefit from more precise feedback about their ability.
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of the potential limits to the benefits of building confidence.
6 Conclusion
How important is confidence for success? Howmalleable are people’s beliefs about their rel-
ative ability? How does a shift in beliefs affect people’s choice of ability-contingent payment
schemes and the level of effort they put in the task?
We present a novel experimental design in which we exogenously shift subjects’ beliefs in
their relative ability by exposing them to a slightly easier or a slightly harder version of the
same test. We then let them choose an incentive scheme under which they will work on a
real effort task. They can either choose to work on an ability-contingent payment scheme
which pays a high amount if they are in the Top Half of their group in the ability test
and a low amount if they are in the Bottom Half; or they can choose to work at a fixed
piece rate. We develop a theoretical framework that separates the ability and the effort
component in the production function and use this as input for our experimental design.
This feature allows us to analyze the effect of a shift in beliefs on incentive choices and
effort separately.
We find that exposing subjects to an easy test, compared to the hard test increases the
average beliefs about how likely they are in the Top Half of their group. This treatment
leads to more subjects choosing the ability-contingent incentives in the easy test condition.
The average level of effort is, however, the same in both conditions and is only slightly
affected by incentives. This is most likely due to a high intrinsic motivation to provide
effort. The overconfidence is a detriment for the low ability individuals, who are most
affected by the treatment and who wrongly self-select into the ability-contingent payment
scheme, causing an even larger inequality in earnings between both types.
One implication is that an intervention aimed at increasing confidence might hurt exactly
those people it is intended to motivate. This holds for tasks in which ability and effort have
a high degree of complementarity in the production function. Our results show that women
have lower pre-treatment levels of confidence than men, but both genders react the same to
the treatment. In our experiment, men’s higher beliefs lead them to make poorer decisions
than women on average.
While we need to be careful with extrapolating our results to decision making in the real
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world, our results illustrate that it is relatively easy to affect people’s confidence with a
slight change in the level of difficulty of a task and that there are settings in which inflating
people’s confidence can have negative implications. Thus, a student facing a challenging
natural science degree might benefit from a few easier tests here and there to keep her
confidence up, but amusic student in a programwheremore than half of the class graduated
with the highest honors might be better off in the long-run with some stricter grading and
more informative feedback about his relative abilities.
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A Appendices
A.1 Theoretical Framework with Risk Aversion
In the main text, we used a simple theoretical framework to organize thinking about what
we might expect from the experimental data. In that discussion, we assumed that indi-
viduals are risk neutral. However most of the intuitions carry through when we relax the
risk neutrality requirement. Below, we show that a similar logic applies if we allow for risk
aversion over monetary payoffs. More specifically, consider an individual who chooses w
and e to maximise:
max
w∈{w¯,w(a)}
max
e≥0
U(w, e) = s · e+ Ea[u(w · e)]− c(e)
where u′(·) > 0, u′′(·) < 0 and u′(0) + s > c′(0). First, we consider the individuals choice
between the two incentive schemes.
Choice of Incentive Scheme
As in the main text, let the optimal effort levels under the ability-contingent and certain
piece rate incentives be denotes by e∗∗AC and e
∗∗
PR (assuming an interior solution). Given
these optimal effort choices under the two incentive schemes, we have the following con-
dition for the individual choosing the ability-contingent incentives. The individual prefers
ability-contingent incentives if:
s · e∗∗AC + πˆ · u(wH · e
∗∗
AC)− c(e
∗∗
AC) ≥ s · e
∗∗
PR + u(w¯ · e
∗∗
PR)− c(e
∗∗
PR)
This inequality implies that there is a threshold subjective belief, πi,r, such that the indi-
vidual prefers to choose the certain piece rate incentives for lower subjective beliefs, i.e.
πˆ ≤ πi,r, and prefers to choose ability-contingent incentives for larger subjective beliefs, i.e.
πˆ ≥ πi,r. In general, we can specify πi,r as follows:
πi,r :=
u(w¯ · e∗∗PR)
u(wH · e∗∗AC)
+
s · (e∗∗PR − e
∗∗
AC)− (c(e
∗∗
PR)− c(e
∗∗
AC))
u(wH · e∗∗AC)
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Notice that if there is a binding constraint on effort in the lab, and optimal effort under
both incentive schemes is given by e¯∗∗, this expressions simplifies to:
πi,r =
u(w¯ · e¯∗∗)
u(wH · e¯∗∗)
The discussion above can be summarised with the following decision rules for incentive
choices:
i. The individual chooses the certain piece rate incentives if she has low self-confidence
(i.e. beliefs on the interval: πˆ ∈ [0, πi,r]).
ii. The individual chooses the risky ability-contingent incentives if she has high self-confidence
(i.e. beliefs on the interval: πˆ ∈ [πi,r, 1]).
Choice of Effort
In the main text, under risk neutrality, the threshold belief at which the individual is in-
different between choosing the ability-contingent and certain piece rate incentives was the
same as the threshold at which the individual would choose the same level of effort under
both incentives schemes. With risk aversion, these two thresholds for (i) incentive scheme
schoice, and (ii) effort choice, are no longer the same.
In this section, we first consider the case where there is an internal solution for the optimal
effort level. Later, we return to the case where effort is constrained in the lab (e.g. due to
time constraints). Effort choices under the two incentive schemes are obtained by solving
the following two equations (assuming interior solutions):
πˆwH · u
′(wH · e) = c
′(e)− s gives e∗∗AC (6)
w¯ · u′(w¯ · e) = c′(e)− s gives e∗∗PR (7)
It is clear that in general e∗∗AC may be either larger or smaller than e
∗∗
PR, depending on the
individual’s subjective belief about her own ability, πˆ. In particular, when πˆ = 0, the indi-
vidual believes that she is low ability for sure, and she chooses more effort under the piece
rate incentives (e∗∗AC < e
∗∗
PR). The reverse is true when she believes that she is the high
ability type for sure ( πˆ = 1⇒ e∗∗AC > e
∗∗
PR ).
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However, since individuals are given a choice of which incentive scheme to choose, it is
of interest to know whether all individuals who choose the ability-contingent incentives
choose a higher effort level than the individuals who choose the fixed piece rate.
In order to answer this question, firstly, notice that the RHS of equations 6 and 7 is identical.
Since the LHS of each equation is decreasing in e, considering the ratio of the LHS of the
two expressions, pˆiwH
w¯
· u
′(wH ·e)
u′(w¯·e)
, can help us to assess which optimal effort choice will be
higher.
Secondly, since wH > w¯ and u
′′(·) < 0, the ratio u
′(wH ·e)
u′(w¯·e)
is increasing as effort increases.
This implies that pˆiwH
w¯
· u
′(wH ·e)
u′(w¯·e)
is also increasing in e. One can think of this term as the ratio
of the marginal shift in utility due to money of an additional unit of effort, under the two
incentive schemes. For ease of exposition, we will refer to the “monetary component” of
the utility function as the part that excludes the intrinsic reward for effort, and the cost of
effort (i.e. Ea[u(w · e)]).
Thirdly, the optimal effort level under thecertain piece rate incentives doesn’t depend on
the individual’s subjective belief about her ability - all individuals choose the same optimal
effort level under certain piece rate, e∗∗PR, irrespective of their belief, πˆ. This means that ir-
respective of πˆ, we can evaluate the ratio of marginal utilities of money, pˆiwH
w¯
· u
′(wH ·e)
u′(w¯·e)
, at the
point of optimal effort under the certain piece rate incentives, e∗∗PR (which doesn’t depend on
πˆ) to determine the threshold value of πˆ for which the optimal effort choice switches from
being higher under certain piece rate incentives to being higher under ability-contingent
incentives.
Define πe,r to be the value of πˆ at which the ratio of marginal utilities of money, pˆiwH
w¯
· u
′(wH ·e)
u′(w¯·e)
,
evaluated at e∗∗PR, is equal to 1. In particular:
πe,r :=
w¯
wH
·
u′(w¯ · e∗∗PR)
u′(wH · e∗∗PR)
(8)
With these definitions for πi,r and πe,r in hand, we can assess the relationship between the
individual’s choice of incentive scheme and her effort choice.
Proposition 1 If the individual chooses the ability-contingent incentives, then she exerts more
effort than she would have if she had faced the fixed piece rate incentives. In particular,
πˆ ≥ πi,r ⇒ πˆ ≥ πe,r
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If she chooses the piece rate incentives, then she chooses more effort under certain piece rate
incentives if πˆ ≤ πe,r, and more effort under ability-contingent incentives if πˆ > πe,r.
Essentially,we show that there are three possible intervals for πˆ that specify incentive choice
and effort choice behaviour:
• If πˆ ∈ [0, πe,r], the individual chooses the certain piece rate incentives and exerts more
effort under certain piece rate incentives than ability-contingent incentives.
• If πˆ ∈ (πe,r, πi,r), the individual would prefer the certain piece rate incentives, but
if she faced the ability-contingent incentives, then she would exert more effort than
under the certain piece rate incentives.
• If πˆ ∈ [πi,r, 1], the individual chooses the ability-contingent incentives and exerts more
effort under ability-contingent incentives than certain piece rate incentives.
Case 1: First we consider πˆ ∈ [0, πe,r), or equivalently, pˆiwH
w¯
·
u′(wH ·e
∗∗
P R
)
u′(w¯·e∗∗
P R
)
< 1. This means that
the monetary marginal utility of effort is lower under ability-contingent incentives than
under certain piece rate incentives at e = e∗∗PR. Therefore, since w¯ ·u
′(w¯ · e∗∗PR) = c
′(e∗∗PR)− s,
we have:
πˆwH · u
′(wH · e
∗∗
PR) < w¯ · u
′(w¯ · e∗∗PR) = c
′(e∗∗PR)− s (9)
But since u′′(·) < 0 and c′′(·) > 0, there cannot be an e > e∗∗PR such that πˆwH · u
′(wH · e) =
c′(e)− s, since the left hand side of equation 6 is decreasing in e and the right hand side is
increasing in e. This implies that when πˆ ∈ [0, πe,r), we must have e∗∗AC < e
∗∗
PR. Essentially,
this says that if the monetary marginal utility of effort is larger under PR, evaluated at
e = e∗∗PR, then the individual will choose a higher effort level under certain piece rate
incentives than under ability-contingent incentives. Notice, also, that since this ratio of
monetary MUs is increasing in e, ∀e ≤ e∗∗PR, we must have:
pˆiwH
w¯
· u
′(wH ·e)
u′(w¯·e)
< 1. Therefore,
the monetary marginal utility ∀e ≤ e∗∗PR is larger under the certain piece rate incentives
than ability-contingent incentives, and the non-monetary component of the utility function
is identical. Therefore, integrating the marginal utilities over e implies that ∀e ≤ e∗∗PR:
s · e+ πˆ · u(wH · e)− c(e) ≤ s · e+ u(w¯ · e)− c(e)
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and since e = e∗∗PR maximises the RHS, and e
∗∗
AC < e
∗∗
PR it must be the case that:
s ·e∗∗AC+ πˆ ·u(wH ·e
∗∗
AC)− c(e
∗∗
AC) < s ·e
∗∗
AC+u(w¯ ·e
∗∗
AC)− c(e
∗∗
AC) ≤ s ·e
∗∗
PR+u(w¯ ·e
∗∗
PR)− c(e
∗∗
PR)
In summary, if πˆ ∈ [0, πe,r), then: (i) e∗∗AC < e
∗∗
PR, and (ii) the individual chooses the certain
piece rate incentives (i.e. πˆ ∈ [0, πi,r)).
Case 2: Second, we consider πˆ ∈ [πe,r, 1], or equivalently, pˆiwH
w¯
·
u′(wH ·e
∗∗
P R
)
u′(w¯·e∗∗
P R
)
≥ 1. Now,
the monetary marginal utility of effort is higher under ability-contingent incentives than
under certain piece rate incentives at e = e∗∗PR. This implies that πˆwH · u
′(wH · e
∗∗
PR) >
w¯ · u′(w¯ · e∗∗PR) = c
′(e∗∗PR) − s, which means that the overall marginal utility of effort under
the ability-contingent incentives is positive at e = e∗∗PR (i.e.
∂UAC(w,e)
∂e
∣
∣
∣
e=e∗∗
P R
> 0. Therefore,
the optimal effort level under the ability-contingent incentives is higher than under the
piece rate incentives e∗∗AC > e
∗∗
PR. However, it is important to note that
pˆiwH
w¯
·
u′(wH ·e
∗∗
P R
)
u′(w¯·e∗∗
P R
)
≥ 1
does not necessarily imply that the individual chooses the ability-contingent incentives. In
Case 2, we can have either choice of incentives.
In summary, if πˆ ∈ [πe,r, 1], then: (i) e∗∗AC ≥ e
∗∗
PR, and (ii) the individual chooses the ability-
contingent incentives if πˆ ∈ [πi,r, 1].
Together, Case 1 and Case 2 show that for the interval of subjective beliefs πˆ ∈ [0, πe,r],
the individual would choose certain piece rate incentives, and would choose higher effort
under certain piece rate incentives than she would under ability-contingent incentives.
For the interval πˆ ∈ [πi,r, 1], the individual would choose the ability-contingent incentives,
and would choose higher effort under ability-contingent incentives than she would under
certain piece rate incentives. And for the interval πˆ ∈ (πe,r, πi,r), the individual prefers
the certain piece rate incentives, but would choose higher effort if she were to face the
ability-contingent incentives.
As a caveat, the discussion above refers to interior solutions for effort choices. Of course, if
effort choices in the lab face a binding constraint (e.g. the time limit), then the discussion
above does not apply, and effort choices are the same under the two incentives schemes.
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Influence on Earnings
The discussion in the main text for the risk-neutral agent essentially maps directly to the
case of the risk-averse agent, replacing: (i) πi with πi,r, (ii) e∗PR with e
∗∗
PR, and (iii) e
∗
AC with
e∗∗AC . All the main intuitions remain the same. Therefore, we have:
Gain in Earnings for High Ability Individuals Due to Upward Shift in Confidence
[FH(π
i,r)− FH(π
i,r −△πˆ)] · (wH · e
∗∗
AC − w¯ · e
∗∗
PR) ≥ 0 (10)
Loss of Earnings for Low Ability Individuals Due to Downward Shift in Confidence
[FL(π
i,r)− FL(π
i,r −△πˆ)] · (0− w¯ · e∗∗PR) ≤ 0 (11)
.
A.2 Gender
Since there is the large body of evidence documenting that there tends to be a gender gap in
confidence in one’s own ability (see, e.g., Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), van Veldhuizen
(2017) and Niederle (2017)), it is of interest to ask whether we observe this gender gap in
our context. We assume that conditional on ability type, men have a higher confidence level
than women (i.e. ∀πˆ : FMm (πˆ) ≤ F
W
m (πˆ), where F
G
m(·) denotes the subjective belief CDF for
individuals of gender, G ∈ {M,W}, and ability type am, with m ∈ L,H). This leads to the
following hypothesis:
• Hypothesis 4 (Gender Differences): Conditional on ability level, the average man
will: (i) hold higher beliefs about his ability, (ii) is more likely to choose the ability-
contingent incentives, (iii) will choose higher effort (if non-binding), in comparison
to the average woman.
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Below, we test these hypotheses and describe how gender is correlated with our outcomes
variables. Our subjects are balanced on gender between treatments and sessions. We show
being male is associated with a similar magnitude upward shift in confidence as our treat-
ment effect, and the pattern of outcomes observed in our treatment-control comparison is
similar to the pattern of outcomes observed in our male-female comparison (except effort
choices).
A.2.1 Gender differences in ability
To eliminate ability differences as an explanation for potential gender differences in beliefs
and payment scheme choices, we selected an ability task that was not gendered and with
no evidence of gender effects in previous experiments. Table 7 in the Appendix shows that
men and women are almost identical in their average scores (8.98 and 8.92), and their
probability of being in the Top Half of their group (0.51 and 0.49). Neither difference is
statistically significant. The similarity in the performance of men and women implies that
ability should not explain any observed differences in beliefs between men and women.
A.2.2 Gender differences in beliefs and incentive choices
In line with the literature documenting the gender confidences gap, Figure 13 shows that
in both our treatment conditions women state lower average beliefs about being in the Top
Half. Table 7 shows that the gender-confidence gap is on average 11 percentage points
and is significant at the 5% level.30
30 If we test for the gender-confidence gap within each treatment separately, the ttest has a p-vale of 0.054 for
the High treatment and 0.29 for the Low treatment, but our sample size is insufficient for robust analysis
at this level of disaggregation.
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Figure 13: Average beliefs about being in the Top Half by gender
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Regarding incentives choices, following their beliefs, men choose the ability-contingent in-
centives more often than women, despite not being more likely to be in the Top Half and
benefit from these incentives. Figure 14 shows the choices of payment scheme separately by
gender and treatment. The pattern is similar to the gender-treatment pattern observed for
beliefs in 13. Table 7 shows that the average woman chooses ability-contingent incentives
50% of the time, while the average man chooses ability-contingent incentives 68% of the
time (p < 0.05). Table 9 shows that men choose ability-contingent incentives more often in
every individual round, with a significant difference in six of the nine rounds. The table is
suggestive of a larger gender gap in choices for later rounds.
More specifically, there appear to be some men who are very unwilling to switch away from
the ability-contingent incentives to the certain piece rate incentives. A striking illustration
of this is that even in round 10 when the certain piece rate incentive piece rate is e0.8,
approximately 50% of men prefer to gamble on being in the Top Half and getting a piece
rate of e1, and earning e0 if they are wrong.
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Figure 14: Propensity to Choose Ability-Contingent Incentives
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A.2.3 Gender differences in earnings
In section 4.4 we showed that an increase in average confidence had no significant effect on
average earnings, but hurts the low-ability individuals. In this section, we consider whether
the gender confidence gap translates into gender differences in earnings. Table 7 shows
that on average, there is no significant difference between the earnings of men (e6.95) and
women (e7.10).31
However, Table 7 also shows that men are exerting significantly higher effort than women
(p < 0.01). Since earnings are determined by both effort and incentive choices, we need
to consider the contributions of effort and choices to earnings separately to understand the
mechanisms. To do this, we remove the role played by effort choices by constructing a
variable that stands for the earnings per unit of effort. Essentially, at the individual level,
we calculate how much an individual earns for each set of 20 sliders she completes. This
31 Figure 19 in the Appendix reports earnings in each treatment-gender group separately. The differences are
not significant.
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variable allows us to measure how optimal the incentive choice decisions are given an indi-
vidual’s level of effort.
Figure 15: Earnings per unit effort, by gender and treatment
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The left panel of Figure 15 reports the average value of this “earnings per unit of effort”
variable for each gender-treatment group. The interesting result here is that women in the
Low confidence treatment group are choosing the correct incentives far more often than
any other group. The intrinsically lower beliefs of women together with the exogenously
triggered lower beliefs by the difficult task lead to more efficient choices by women in this
group. To provide a benchmark for how well these women do, in the right-hand panel we
plot four benchmark earnings per unit effort possibilities: (1) average earnings for a group
who all choose completely optimally, (2) average earnings for a groupwho all always choose
the certain piece rate incentives, (3) average earnings for a group who all always choose the
ability-contingent incentives, (4) average earnings for a group who always choose randomly
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between incentive schemes.
Except women in the Low treatment, participants are on average performing rather poorly
in terms of incentive choices, scoring between e0.52 and e0.55 per unit of effort. This
amount is only a little more than they would earn if they chose completely randomly
(e0.50). However, women in the Low treatment earn e0.65 per unit effort, which is closer
to the first best value of e0.73 than random choice.
A.2.4 Gender summary
In our results, there is no evidence that risk aversion had a mediating effect for either gen-
der. This result adds to the evidence that gender differences in payment scheme choices
are significantly affected by beliefs about relative ability rather than just competitive pref-
erences or risk aversion (van Veldhuizen, 2017). Since it is not a competition, anxiety, fear
or thrill should not play a role during the real effort task. There are no externalities im-
posed on the other participants when an individual exerts a high effort, so other regarding
preferences are not relevant here. Women chose the ability-contingent piece rate when
they believe that they are in the upper half of the group. In our design, the most successful
subjects were the on average less confident women because they were better at selecting
into the top and bottom group according to their actual ability.
54
A.3 Additional Tables
Table 6: Comparison of means by treatment
LOW HIGH
Male (=1) 0.48 0.54
(0.51) (0.50)
Age 25.20 24.62
(6.55) (3.88)
Effort (Baseline Task, per min) 9.55 9.91
(1.80) (1.70)
Risk (CE p=50) 0.48 0.49
(0.16) (0.14)
Treatment Variables
Treatment (High =1) 0 1
(0.00) (0.00)
Ability Score 6.92 10.90***
(2.79) (1.20)
Ability Top Half (=1) 0.50 0.50
(0.51) (0.51)
Outcome Variables
Subj Belief (%) 64.20 83.92***
(31.67) (20.16)
AC Incentive Choice (Frac) 0.50 0.69***
(0.37) (0.32)
Effort (Main Task, per min) 12.15 12.18
(2.29) (2.04)
Earnings (Main Task) 7.27 6.69
(4.78) (5.14)
Risk (CE p=Subj Belief) 0.56 0.71***
(0.23) (0.22)
N 50 50
Notes: (i) standard deviations in parentheses, t-tests:
*=10%, **=5%, ***=1%
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Table 7: Comparison of means by gender
Female Male
Male (=1) 0 1
(0.00) (0.00)
Age 23.96 25.16
(3.61) (4.37)
Effort (Baseline Task, per min) 9.46 10.11*
(1.62) (1.79)
Risk (CE p=50) 0.48 0.48
(0.16) (0.13)
Treatment Variables
Treatment (High =1) 0.49 0.55
(0.51) (0.50)
Ability Score 8.98 8.92
(2.71) (3.23)
Ability Top Half (=1) 0.51 0.49
(0.51) (0.51)
Outcome Variables
Subj Belief (%) 67.74 79.55**
(29.55) (26.38)
AC Incentive Choice (Frac) 0.50 0.68**
(0.36) (0.34)
Effort (Main Task, per min) 11.65 12.79***
(1.89) (2.17)
Earnings (Main Task) 7.10 6.95
(4.15) (5.62)
Risk (CE p=Subj Belief) 0.56 0.70***
(0.24) (0.22)
N 47 49
Notes: (i) standard deviations in parentheses, t-tests:
*=10%, **=5%, ***=1% (ii) The 3 missing women, and 1
missing man answered “Prefer not to answer” to the gender
question in the survey.
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Table 8: Comparison of mean incentive choices by treatment
LOW HIGH
Treatment (High =1) 0 1
(0.00) (0.00)
Subj Belief (%) 64.20 83.92***
(31.67) (20.16)
Ability Top Half (=1) 0.50 0.50
(0.51) (0.51)
Incentive Choices
AC Incentive Choice (All Rounds) 0.50 0.69***
(0.37) (0.32)
AC Incentives Round 1 (=1) 1 1
(0.00) (0.00)
AC Incentives Round 2 (=1) 0.76 0.90*
(0.43) (0.30)
AC Incentives Round 3 (=1) 0.76 0.84
(0.43) (0.37)
AC Incentives Round 4 (=1) 0.64 0.84**
(0.48) (0.37)
AC Incentives Round 5 (=1) 0.52 0.74**
(0.50) (0.44)
AC Incentives Round 6 (=1) 0.40 0.70***
(0.49) (0.46)
AC Incentives Round 7 (=1) 0.36 0.58**
(0.48) (0.50)
AC Incentives Round 8 (=1) 0.38 0.58**
(0.49) (0.50)
AC Incentives Round 9 (=1) 0.38 0.54
(0.49) (0.50)
AC Incentives Round 10 (=1) 0.32 0.46
(0.47) (0.50)
N 50 50
Notes: (i) Ability Top Half: Reflects fraction of individuals in top half.
Equals 0.5 by construction. (ii) AC Incentive Choice (All Rounds):
individual level variable, averaged across all an individual’s choices.
(iii) standard deviations in parentheses, t-tests: *=10%, **=5%, ***=1%
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Table 9: Comparison of mean incentive choices by gender
Female Male
Treatment (High =1) 0.49 0.55
(0.51) (0.50)
Subj Belief (%) 67.74 79.55**
(29.55) (26.38)
Ability Top Half (=1) 0.51 0.49
(0.51) (0.51)
Incentive Choices
AC Incentive Choice (All Rounds) 0.50 0.68**
(0.36) (0.34)
AC Incentives Round 1 (=1) 1 1
(0.00) (0.00)
AC Incentives Round 2 (=1) 0.74 0.92**
(0.44) (0.28)
AC Incentives Round 3 (=1) 0.70 0.88**
(0.46) (0.33)
AC Incentives Round 4 (=1) 0.70 0.80
(0.46) (0.41)
AC Incentives Round 5 (=1) 0.60 0.67
(0.50) (0.47)
AC Incentives Round 6 (=1) 0.40 0.67***
(0.50) (0.47)
AC Incentives Round 7 (=1) 0.34 0.59**
(0.48) (0.50)
AC Incentives Round 8 (=1) 0.34 0.59**
(0.48) (0.50)
AC Incentives Round 9 (=1) 0.36 0.55*
(0.49) (0.50)
AC Incentives Round 10 (=1) 0.28 0.49**
(0.45) (0.51)
N 47 49
Notes: (i) Ability Top Half: Reflects fraction of individuals in top half.
(ii) AC Incentive Choice (All Rounds): individual level variable,
averaged across all an individual’s choices. (iii) standard deviations in
parentheses, t-tests: *=10%, **=5%, ***=1%
58
A.4 Additional Figures
Figure 16: Risk preferences
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Figure 17: Distribution of Earnings between Treatments
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Figure 18: Effort per unit effort, by gender and treatment
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Figure 19: Average earnings by gender and treatment
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Figure 20: Propensity to Score in the Top Half
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Figure 21: Average effort level by gender and treatment
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